

XII.—HOW TO TALK.

SOME SIMPLE WAYS.

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CAN to describe X as Y really be the same as to call X Y? Or again the same as to state that X is Y? Have we, in using such a variety of terms for simple speech-acts, any clear and serious distinctions in mind? The presumption must surely be that we have: and what follows is an attempt to isolate and schematise some of them. But it is not contended that it contains an exact or full or final account of our ordinary uses of any one of the terms for speech-acts discussed. For one thing, this is a mere essay at one section of what must be a very large theme; for another, essential though it is as a preliminary to track down the detail of our ordinary uses of words, it seems that we shall in the end always be compelled to straighten them out to some extent.

We shall consider a simplified model of a situation in which we use language for talking about the world. This model we shall call by the name "Speech-situation S_0 ".

Possibly we never are actually in a situation exactly like S_0 : more probably we sometimes are so, or, more strictly, regard ourselves for current intents and purposes as being so. But the purpose of considering the model is to elucidate some of our ordinary thought and language about the uses of speech: and it seems hardly deniable that in such thought and language we do, for better or worse and whether consciously or unconsciously, make use of such models (not, of course, necessarily only one such).

The world, then, in S_0 will consist of numerous individual *items*, each of one and only one definite *type*. Each type is totally and equally different from every other type: each item is totally and equally distinct from every other item.

Numerous items may be of the same type, but no item is of more than one type. Item and type are (to speak with necessary roughness) apprehended by inspection merely. (Roughly, the world might consist of an orderless plurality of amorphous colour-patches, each of either the same pure red, or the same pure blue, or the same pure yellow. Then won't they be alike in being coloured, and possibly in other further general features? This must be ruled out—perhaps by the consideration that in these other respects every item in our world is identical with every other, so that nothing can be said about them: or perhaps by alterations and refinements—every item is *either* a colour-patch of the same pure red, *or* a noise of the same definite pitch, intensity, etc., *or* a smell, etc.: but anyway, by the ruling that our language is not going to be equipped to deal with any such further features.)

The language in S_0 will permit of the utterance only of sentences of one form, form S:

I is a T.

Besides the expression “is a”, which is used invariably in every sentence in the position shown above, our language may contain an indefinite number of other vocables to be inserted in the place of the “I” or the “T” in form S. Assuming that the conventions next to be mentioned have been established, each of these vocables will be either an I-word or a T-word in the language: and any utterance consisting of an I-word followed by “is a” followed by a T-word will be a sentence in the language. Nothing else will be a sentence.

In order for this language to be used for talking about this world, two sets of (semantic) conventions will be needed. I-conventions, or conventions of *reference*, are needed in order to fix which item it is that the vocable which is to be an I-word is to refer to on each (and in our simple case, on *every*) occasion of the uttering (assertive) of a sentence containing it: we shall not concern ourselves here with the nature or genesis of these conventions, but simply take it that each item has had allotted to it its own I-word by

which it is uniquely referred to, and each I-word similarly its own item. For I-words we shall use in what follows numerals, *e.g.*, “1227”, and we shall speak of them in use not as “(proper) names”, of which they are at most only a primitive variety, but as “references.” T-conventions, or conventions of *sense*, are needed in order to associate the vocables which are to be T-words with the item-types, one to one: these conventions we may inaugurate by one or other of two procedures of linguistic legislation, *viz.*

1. Name-giving.
2. Sense-giving.

Name-giving (“naming” in one ordinary sense, but not, *e.g.*, in the sense of “giving the name *of*” or of “*putting* a name to”) consists in allotting a certain vocable to a certain item-type as its “name”. Sense-giving (“defining” in the sense of “ostensive definition”, here in a simplified world) consists in allotting a certain item-type to a certain vocable as its “sense”. These two procedures, at least in our simplified situation, produce the same upshot: when either has been gone through, the item-type, attached by nature to certain items, is attached by convention to a certain vocable, now a T-word and (as we shall call it) its “name”, as the “sense” of that word.¹

Every word in our language in S_0 (except for “is” and “a”) has either a reference fixed by I-conventions or a sense fixed by T-conventions, but not both, and is accordingly either an I-word or a T-word.

We shall not go into the “metaphysical status” of types and senses (nor of items). If we went back to the rudiments

¹ The difference between name-giving and sense-giving is important in some connexions, though not here. If, not happily, we were to use, as we shall not, sentences of our form S for inaugurating T-conventions, there would be between “1227 is a *rhombus*” (name-giving) and “1227 is a rhombus” (sense-giving) a difference in *direction* of allotment similar to that difference in direction of fit which is to be mentioned shortly. I say “not happily” because, *e.g.*, if our interest were in linguistic legislation, we had better go back behind “proper names” to “that” and “this”. But we are *not* here concerned with how these conventions are established, *nor* even to assert, for example, that the two types could be established independently of one another. All this is mere preliminary.

of speech theory, both might appear as “ constructions ”. Nevertheless, to talk of types and senses², and, as we shall, of matching the one to the other, is not necessarily inexpedient in all contexts: and in particular it is expedient in our present context, where we are engaged to elucidate some of our ordinary language about speech-acts, since such ordinary language does embody a model like S_0 . Conceive of our items here as, say, a number of *samples* or *specimens* of colours, or of (geometrical) shapes, each with a reference-numeral allotted to it: conceive of our senses as a number of standards or *patterns* of colours, or of (geometrical) shapes, each with a name allotted to it: think of name-giving or sense-giving as involving *the selection of a sample or specimen as a standard pattern*. This is not so far from the truth.

Let us now take the stage of linguistic legislation as over. We proceed to use our language in accordance with that legislation to talk about the world. Then a satisfactory utterance (assertive) on any particular occasion will be one where the item referred to by the I-word in accordance with the conventions of reference is of a (in S_0 , the) type which matches the sense which is attached by the conventions of sense to the T-word. For the utterance to be satisfactory, we require the presence of

*both a conventional link between I-word and item, and
another between T-word and sense,
and a natural link (match)*³ between type and sense.

We shall call the expression “ is a ” as uttered in the uttering (assertive, of course: I shall omit this necessary qualification in future) of a sentence of form S by the name “ assertive link ”, and any utterance of form S an “ assertion ”. Then the assertion is justified not *merely* by convention, nor *merely* by nature, but in a complex or roundabout way. Diagrammatically:

² Or ? : “ types ” and “ senses ”. “ Talk of ” gives trouble with inverted commas, for reasons which can be understood.

³ Here, in S_0 , taken to be *purely* natural—apprehended by inspection without admixture of convention. This does not obtain in more complicated situations.

"1227"	"is a"	"rhombus"
(I-word)	(assertive link)	(T-word)
conventional link (reference)		conventional link (sense)
item/type (sample)	natural link (match)	sense (pattern)

All this is, I hope, simple—and, it may be again emphasized, highly simplified. It is now time to get out of the way, as a preliminary, two very primitive ways in which I may on any occasion go wrong in my utterance. I may be guilty of

1. Misnaming.
2. Misreferring.

In both of these cases I match sample to pattern or pattern to sample it may be quite unexceptionably, but

1. I quote (give) the name wrongly.
2. I quote (give) the reference wrongly.

In either case alike I *mislead*, or more strictly *tend pro tanto* to mislead (not myself, at least at the time—if indeed that makes sense, but) my hearers who know the language. Misleading, at least as I use the term here, goes, it should be noted, to the *meaning* of the utterance, not to the *facts*: whether or not I create additionally in those hearers, or more strictly tend to create in them, a *misapprehension* as to the facts depends *additionally* on whether or not I have been correct in matching sample to pattern (or conversely), a quite distinct consideration. I mislead (as to meaning) when, through my use of the wrong I-word or T-word, my hearers are caused, in assessing or relying on the justifiability of my assertion, to advert to a different sample or a different

pattern from that which I, in making the assertion, was adverting to.⁴

Misnaming and misreferring alike may be either *aberrational* or *idiosyncratic*. Aberrational misnaming or misreferring is a *sin against* my accepted linguistic legislation: my sample list is rightly numbered, my pattern stock is rightly labelled, but through aberration I quote or give the number or the name wrongly. Idiosyncratic misnaming or misreference is due to a *fault in* my accepted linguistic legislation: though I quote or give the number or the name rightly, my sample list is wrongly numbered or my pattern stock is wrongly labelled.⁵

Whenever in S_0 I utter an assertion, I am *eo ipso* referring and also naming (using these terms, as I shall here only do, in senses analogous to misnaming and misreferring as explained above). But in contrast with other varieties of speech-act, to be discussed next, which in uttering an assertion we may be said to be performing, "referring" and "naming" are terms for only *parts*, and we may say *ancillary* parts, of my performance on any occasion. By contrast, when we say, for example, that in uttering the assertion "1227 is a rhombus" I am *identifying* 1227 as a rhombus or *stating* that 1227 is a rhombus, then the *whole* issuing of the utterance is the making of the identification or the making of the statement, and the *whole* utterance is (in my use—not, of course, in every use) the identification or the statement.⁶ You are guilty of misreferring in using, in making your assertion, the word "1227", or of misnaming in using the word "rhombus": but you are guilty of making a misidentification or of making a misstatement in using the sentence "1227 is a rhombus". The issuing of the *whole*

⁴ "Misleading" is a speech-act of a totally distinct class from those speech-acts with which this paper is concerned. There are, of course, many such distinct classes.

⁵ Clearly, in combination an aberration and an idiosyncrasy *may* cancel each other out, may not "tend to mislead" on that occasion. Just as, similarly, a combination of misnaming with misreferring, or of either or both with mismatching, *may* not on a particular occasion tend to create a misapprehension. It is characteristic of ordinary language that it should not (bother to) have simple names for complex faults, such as these are.

utterance cannot be an act of misnaming or of misreferring, nor, similarly, of naming (in my usage) or of referring.⁶

Let us henceforward take it, not merely that the stage of linguistic legislation is over, but also that we are not, in issuing our utterances, guilty of sins against, or of sins through faults in, our accepted linguistic legislation.

There now arise four distinct uses to which we may put our sentence "1227 is a rhombus", four distinct speech-acts which, in uttering it as an assertion, we may be said to be performing,—four species, if you like, of the generic speech-act of asserting. These will be called:

c-identifying, cap-fitting or placing;
b-identifying, bill-filling or casting;
stating;
instancing.

How does this complexity arise? For let it be repeated that in none of these performances are we to be taken as in any way legislating, but only as performing in accordance with the terms and purposes of an accepted legislation. And furthermore, we are still excluding a complication of great importance, which will be introduced only later, namely, that our vocabulary may be "inadequate" to the variety presented by the world we are to talk about: we are still taking our legislation as adequate in the sense that every item in the world is of one type only, which matches precisely the sense of one name only. Complexity arises, nevertheless, owing to the complexity, which may escape notice, of the notions of "fitting" and "matching".

We have already noticed in passing, in the case of name-giving and sense-giving, the distinction in point of *direction*

⁶ Sometimes we use "the identification", like "the description" and unlike "the statement", for, we may say, a *part* of the utterance: but I am using it only for the *whole* utterance, so as to assimilate identifying, as it should be assimilated, to stating and not to naming (in my use). Even if "the identification" can be used, as is "the name", for a part of the *utterance*, still "identifying" is not a name for a part of *my performance in issuing* the utterance (as "naming", in my use, always is), but for the whole of it. That part of our utterance is a name or a reference says nothing to prejudge the type of assertive speech-act to which our whole performance in issuing the utterance belongs: but that part of it is an identification or a description tells us precisely that (in, of course, our simplified speech-situations).


between allotting an X to a Y and allotting a Y to an X. In a similar way, when we operate in accordance with such legislation, there is a difference in *direction of fit* between fitting a name to an item (or an item *with* the name) and fitting an item to a name (or a name *with* the item). These differ as fitting a nut with a bolt differs from fitting a bolt with a nut. We may be "given" a name, and purport to produce an item of a type which matches (or is matched by) the sense of that name: this production we declare by uttering an assertion of form S with the given name as T-word and the reference of the produced item as I-word. To utter an assertion in this way is to fit an item to a name. Conversely, we may be "given" an item, and purport to produce a name with a sense which matches (or is matched by) the type of that item: this production we declare by uttering an assertion of form S with the reference of the given item as I-word and the produced name as T-word. To utter an assertion in this way is to fit a name to an item.

But there is also another distinction to be drawn. We fit the name to the item or the item to the name on the ground that the *type* of the item and the *sense* of the name *match*. But in matching X and Y, there is a distinction between matching X to Y and matching Y to X, which may be called a distinction in point of *onus of match*. We are apt to overlook this with the verb "match"⁷ (especially where it is being taken to mean "match *exactly*"): but if we consider the analogous word "assimilate", the distinction between assimilating X to Y, where the onus of assimilability is on X, and assimilating Y to X, where the onus of assimilability is on Y, is clear enough. We go wrong in assimilating because we are mistaken about or misrepresent the nature of the member, X in the first case and Y in the second, on which the onus of assimilability rests. When we ask whether we should assimilate X to Y, the question is *whether* X has the qualities Y *has*: a simile,

⁷ If X matches Y, Y matches X: just as, if X fits Y, Y fits X. But if I match X to Y, I do not match Y to X, any more than, if I fit X to Y, I fit Y to X.

"A is like B", is a bad simile not because B has not the features which A has or has features which A has not, but because A has not the features which B has or has features which B has not.

These two distinctions generate our four different performances in uttering "1227 is a rhombus", which are, in the form of a diagram:



To explain first the choice of terms. We use the useful word "identify", understandably enough, in two opposite ways: we may speak of "identifying it (as a daphnia)" when you hand it to me and ask me if I can identify it, and I say that it is a daphnia: but we also speak of "identifying a daphnia" (or "identifying the daphnia") when you hand me a slide and ask me if I can identify a daphnia (or the daphnia) in it. In the first case we are finding a cap to fit a given object: hence the name "cap-fitting" or "c-identifying". We are trying to "place" it. But in the second case we are trying to find an object to fill a given bill: hence the name "b-identifying" or "bill-filling". We "cast" this thing as the daphnia.⁸ The terms "stating" and "instancings" should need no explanation: to instance is to cite *I* as an instance of *T*.

⁸ Contrast the questions: (a) *What* (part of speech) is the word underlined in the following sentence: He was going downhill? (b) *Which* is the adverb in the following sentence: He was going downhill? Answers: (a) An adverb (cap-fitting); (b) "Downhill" (bill-filling). We might even christen c-identifying "what-identifying" and b-identifying "which-identifying".

In the diagram the connecting lines, horizontal and vertical, indicate the way in which the members of each pair connected are similar to each other, as follows:

The *horizontal line* indicates that the *direction of fit* is the same. In both placing and stating we are fitting names to given items, in both instancing and casting we are fitting items to given names. In the verbalisations given in the diagram, that which is being fitted *to* is shown by italics, in contrast to that which is being fitted *with*, which is not in italics.

The *vertical line* indicates that the *onus of match* is the same. In both placing and instancing the type of the item is taken for granted and the question might be whether the sense of the T-word is such as really to match it: in both stating and casting the sense of the T-word is taken for granted, and the question might be whether the type of the item is really such as to match it. In the verbalisations given in the diagram, that, name or item, on the sense or type of which lies the onus of match is put as the subject.

Or again:

To *place* we have to find a pattern to match to this sample.

To *state* we have to find a pattern to match this sample to.

To *instance* we have to find a sample to match this pattern to.

To *cast* we have to find a sample to match to this pattern.

Or again, the differences and likenesses between the four performances may be brought out by considering wherein, if any one of them is faultily executed, the fault lies:—

To *misidentify* (= misplace) shows that we have gone wrong in our matching through failure to appreciate, to keep clearly before ourselves for the purpose of this matching,

the sense of the name (T-word). "I see now, I was wrong to identify it as magenta: magenta, of course, on reflexion, is not what this is." The mistake is due, we might say, using a word more obviously appropriate in more complicated situations than S_0 , to "misconception" of the sense.

Misidentifying must be carefully distinguished from what we have called "misnaming". There, the name is "wrong" even though, and whether or not, the sense, wrongly allotted to it, does match the type of the item: whereas here the name is "wrong" *because* the sense, rightly allotted to it, does *not* match the type of the item. If I have misnamed, I shouldn't have said it was a "rhombus": if I have misidentified, I shouldn't have said it was a rhombus. (Ambiguity of "said".)

It may be asked, Doesn't misidentifying remain, nevertheless, itself a (merely) "linguistic" mistake? This is reminiscent of the argument that misstatement is impossible, which so long entangled the Greeks, and is perhaps hard to answer because "linguistic" is vague. The basic point, never to be surrendered, is that mistakes in matching are possible, do occur, and that they may be due to faulty grasp of *either* of the two elements being matched. Just as we can (do) advert to the same item and yet match its type to differing patterns (misperception), so we can advert to the same sense and match it to differing types of items. If it is indeed hard to imagine our making such a mistake in such a simple situation as S_0 , perhaps after all it is equally hard to imagine, here, misperception and consequent misstatement. (Yet in one way our model of patterns and samples may be helpful; for it suggests that agreement as to the "sense" of some name, a term we have admitted to be not ultimate in speech theory, is in the last resort established by agreement upon the *items* the types of which are to be standards, leaving those types themselves still to be appraised by perception and so liable to the, admittedly possible, errors of perception.)

To *misinstance* likewise reveals misconception of the sense of the name. It is to be distinguished from misreferring:

there, the reference is "wrong" even *though* the sense *does* match the type, whereas here the reference is "wrong" *because* the sense does *not* match the type. I shouldn't have said "1227" was one: or, I shouldn't have said 1227 was one.

To *misstate* shows that we do not correctly appraise the type of the item: it is due, we may say in our simple situation, to *misperceiving* the sample.

To *misidentify* (=miscast) likewise reveals misperception of the type of the item.

This brings out the similarity between placing and instancing and again between stating and casting. In another way, we might bring out the similarity between placing and stating on the one hand and between instancing and casting on the other: to a misplacing or a misstatement we respond with "But 1227 *isn't* a rhombus", but to a misinstance or a miscasting we respond with "But 1227 *isn't* a rhombus". (Needless to say, we cannot so respond in S_0 , where we are not equipped with negation: to introduce negation alters the situation—though of course I have no wish to suggest that negation is "posterior" to affirmation, or that assimilating even "makes sense" without contrasting.)

Finally, one further and perhaps less clear way of bringing out the contrast between placing and stating, and likewise between instancing and casting. In both placing and stating we fit the name to the item, but in placing the interest is in linking *the name to the type* via the sense, whereas in stating the interest is in linking *the sense to the item* via the type: it is primarily, we may say, the *type* that we identify⁹ but primarily the *item* about which we state. Similarly, in both instancing and casting we fit the item to the name, but it is primarily the *type* that we instance and primarily the *item* that we cast.

⁹ It should be unnecessary to point out that I am never using "identify" here in the sense of identifying an item as the same item again, which is a feat demanding a speech-situation far more complex than S_0 . Moreover, in a situation where, say, a single item may have more than one feature, the sense of "identify" will suffer a sea-change.

It is now time to inject a first dose of complexity into our model of the speech-situation. We shall now suppose that there occur in the world to be talked about items of types which do not exactly match any of the patterns in our stock (the sense of any of our names), though they may be more or less similar to one or to more than one of those patterns. This new model situation will be called by the name "Speech-situation S_1 ".

It is to be noted that each item in the world is still being assumed to be of *one type only*—or to possess, we may say, one feature only, or to be assessable in one dimension only. For example, if our original patterns are colours, they may be a (certain shade of) red, a (certain shade of) blue and a (certain shade of) yellow. Then in S_0 , every item which occurs will be either a red (of the pattern shade) or a blue (of the pattern shade) or a yellow (of the pattern shade): but in S_1 , items may occur of any colour—they may be (what we should ordinarily call) white, and so resemble none of the patterns, or none more than another, or (what we should ordinarily call) pink, and so resemble one of our patterns appreciably and none of the others at all, or (what we should ordinarily call) purple, and so resemble two of our patterns equally but the rest not at all, or (what we should ordinarily call) crimson and so resemble one of our patterns most closely but another appreciably and the rest not at all, and so on. But in S_1 none of the items must be conceived as having, for example, shape or size to be talked about as well as colour, though they might have, for example, shape but no colour. It is only in some further model of the speech-situation, to be called say " S_2 " but not here discussed, that we might introduce the complication that the *same* item may possess more than one feature or be of more than one type or be assessable in more than one dimension.

It is obvious that the "complication" here introduced in S_1 is inevitable in most actual speech-situations. The actual world is, to all human intents and purposes, indefinitely various; but we cannot handle an indefinitely large vocabulary; nor, generally speaking, do we wish to insist on the minutest detectable differences, but rather on

relative similarities; nor, with our limited experience both as individuals and as a race, can we anticipate in our vocabulary vagaries of nature which have yet to be revealed.

Faced, then, with some such item in S_1 , the type of which does not exactly match the sense of any one of the names in our stock, what courses are open to us? We can of course (as with the resources in speech-acts available in S_0 we must, to be correct) say nothing—in default of some fresh legislation: and this we shall still do if the type of the recalcitrant item resembles none of our patterns at all, or none more than another. More generally, however, the type of the item resembling the sense of some one of our names *sufficiently* well, and more closely than it resembles the senses of others of our names, we may say, using that name, “1228 is a polygon”. When we speak in this way, a new set of terms becomes appropriate for the four different speech-acts which, in saying “1228 is a polygon”, we may be performing. The four performances are distinguished, as in S_0 , by means of direction of fit and onus of match, but we now term them:

Calling
Exemplifying

Describing
Classing

When we *call*¹⁰ 1228 a polygon or *describe* it as a polygon, it is admitted, by the use of these terms for our speech-acts, that the name does not exactly fit the item—because in the one case the sense does not exactly match to the type and in the other case the type does not exactly match to the sense.

If we are accused of *wrongly* calling 1228 a polygon, or of *miscalling* it a polygon, then we are accused of *abusing language*, of doing violence to language. In calling 1228 a polygon, we admit a multiformity into our pattern, we modify or stretch the sense of our name, and future uses of the name will be influenced by the precedent here set. If on the other hand we are accused of *wrongly describing*, or of *misdescribing*, 1228 as a polygon, we are accused of

¹⁰ Not: call 1228 a “polygon”. Ambiguity of “call”.

doing violence *to the facts*. In describing 1228 as a polygon we impose admittedly a uniformity on our specimens, we are simplifying or neglecting the specificity of the type of the item 1228, and we are committing ourselves thereby to a certain view of it.

In the same way, briefly, when we give *examples* as opposed to instances we admit a multiformity in the pattern to which justice is not done by one specimen, and when we *class* some item as a polygon, as opposed to identifying (casting) it as a polygon, we admit to a neglect of the full specificity of the item.

Two warnings may be here repeated, concerning the "ordinary" use of such terms as "call" and "describe". Firstly, these same terms may be used of speech-acts performed in envisaged speech-situations *other* than S_1 , e.g., in a speech-situation in which the same item may possess more than one feature, to draw attention to features of such speech-acts other than (though no doubt connected with) the features just described above. Secondly, it is likely enough that our ordinary use of the terms is fairly loose, that we do not always distinguish carefully between them, although there is a distinction which can be marked by their means. Contrast, for example, the following:

- (1) You call that crimson? But surely no crimson can have so much blue in it? That's not what crimson is at all.

You describe it as crimson? But look, it has a lot of blue in it. It's not really like crimson at all.

- (2) He calls me a dictator, in spite of the fact that I have notoriously always acted only on the advice of Parliament!

He describes me as a dictator, whereas in fact, as he must have known, I have always acted only on the advice of Parliament.

If many such examples are studied, the watershed between calling and describing appears to take shape.

Though cases in which we shall have to call, describe, etc., instead of, in black-and-white terms, identifying, stating, etc., are sure to arise continually, we feel ourselves sometimes bound to cope with them as they arise by means of fresh linguistic legislation. In calling there is indeed already implicit an element of legislation by precedent—this is case law and will regularly be necessary: but we may also demand statute law. Naturally, if the type of an item is highly novel, and does not appreciably resemble any of our stock of patterns, or none rather than another, it will be preferable not to call it or describe it by any of the names in our existent vocabulary, but rather to allot this type to some altogether new name as its sense: this is legislation of the kind already familiar in S_0 . But suppose the new type does match fairly well one, or more than one, of our existing stock of patterns, suppose 1228 is genuinely *like* a red, *i.e.*, our hitherto familiar specific red. Our fresh legislation will then take the typical S_1 form of classification and differentiation. That is, we shall not merely allot a new name, a “specific” name, say “crimson”, to the type, but we shall also adopt the convention that *crimson is a sort of red*, thus giving the explicitness of statute law to the modification in the sense of the name “red” and recognising “red” as the name of a multiform pattern, *i.e.*, as a generic name. This legislation will show itself, in our restricted language, by the phenomenon of entailment between sentences of form S , which now appears for the first time: henceforward, “1228 is a crimson” will entail “1228 is a red”. The phenomenon merely of incompatibility was already present even in S_0 , for even there “1227 is a red” was incompatible, according to our legislation, with “1227 is a green”.

In the above account we have not, of course, dealt with by any means all of the kinds of case that arise in S_1 . We have discussed the case where the novel type is like, up to a point but not beyond it, the sense of one of our available names, but not appreciably like the sense of any other—the case, we may say, where there is only one name for more than one variety of type (calling) or more than one variety of type for a single name (describing). But there are also,

say, cases where the type resembles up to a point more than one of our available patterns—where, we may say, there are two names to call one type by, or a single type which may be described by two names. Such different varieties of cases lead appropriately now to the introduction of specific words (differentiation) and now to the introduction of generic words (classification). It should be unnecessary further to point out that in a fully-fledged language we have, of course, numerous additional devices for coping with the kind of cases arising typically in S_1 , devices such as the useful words “like”, “real”, etc.: but in S_1 our language is still restricted to sentences of the form S .

This sort of investigation of the nature of speech-acts might go on more or less indefinitely. I propose to stop at this point, where we have barely begun upon the complexities of “calling”, “describing”, etc. Obviously what is here written is imperfect and probably it is wrong in many ways: but what I should like to have succeeded in doing is in calling renewed attention to the following points:—

- (1) Names for speech-acts are more numerous, more specialised, more ambiguous and more significant than is ordinarily allowed for: none of them can be safely used in philosophy in a general way (*e.g.*, “statement” or “description”) without more investigation than they have, I think, yet received. Here of course we have been concerned with only a few speech-acts of a single family, but naturally there are other whole families besides.
- (2) To some extent we probably do, even in ordinary language, make use of models of the speech-situation in using the terms that we do for speech-acts. At any rate, the construction of such models can help towards clarifying the varieties of speech-act which are possible. Any such model, even the simplest, seems bound to be fairly complicated—too complicated for the standard subject-predicate or class-membership

model. Moreover, we seem bound to use a whole series of different models, because *the difference between one named speech-act and another often resides principally in a difference between the speech-situations envisaged for their respective performances.*

I have touched not merely upon very few speech-acts, but also upon only very few features of these, and in highly simplified situations only. A feature, for example, in which different speech-acts even of the same family may differ very much is that commonly discussed in an entirely general way under the name of "truth": even, say, with speech-acts which are assertions, we often prefer for one a different term of approbation from that which we prefer for another, and usually for good and understandable reasons. This, however, I shall not pursue here, but instead conclude by giving a short example of how a small variation in our model of the speech-situation, this time on the *language* side rather than on the side of the world, will have repercussions on the speech-acts we perform.

Hitherto we have confined ourselves, in our sentence form S, to *affirmative* assertions. But if we now introduce a second sentence form "SN", viz.

"I is not a T",

we find that this, unlike form S, is not equally usable for the performance of all four of our speech-acts in S_0 . By introducing this sentence form, we bring out a resemblance not hitherto pointed out, between c-identifying and b-identifying in contrast with stating and instancing, which might be symbolised in our diagram by linking them with a *diagonal* line, thus:—

c-identifying	>	stating
instancing	<	b-identifying

A sentence of form SN will be correct on any occasion of its utterance if the type of the item referred to by "I" and the sense of the name "T" do *not* match—where "I is a T" assimilates sense and type, "I is not a T" contrasts

them. We may call this speech-situation, which is the same as S_0 except for the introduction of the negative sentence form SN, "speech-situation S_{ON} ".

When in situation S_{ON} I utter the sentence "1229 is not a T", then I may be *stating* something about 1229, but I cannot be identifying it—to say that 1229 is not something is not to identify it. In both stating and identifying our utterance is intended to fit a name to, to pin a label to, the item: but there was a difference between the two performances in point of onus of match. And it now appears that where the interest is in matching a sense to the type, nothing is achieved to the purpose by the production of a sense which does *not* match the type. To tell us that 1229 is not a T is not to tell us what it is, nor to identify it. But where, on the other hand, the interest is in matching the type to a sense, something is achieved to the purpose even by the discovery that the type does not match some or any one particular sense. We identify 1229 as *red* as opposed to *blue*, etc., but we state that 1229 *is* red as opposed to *is not* red.

In a similar but opposite manner, when I utter the sentence "1229 is not a T", I may be giving a negative or counter instance, but I cannot be identifying (casting): there is no such thing as a negative or counter identification. In both instancing and casting I am fitting an item to the name: but where I am matching the sense to a type something significant is achieved even by a refusal to match, whereas where I am matching a type to the sense, nothing is achieved by a failure to match. We identify (cast) 1229 as a square, as opposed to 1228, etc., but we instance 1229 as a square as opposed to not a square.

So far, it has been said that the sentence form SN is in order when we are matching *the* (given) sense/type to *a* (produced) type/sense, but not in order when we are matching *a* (produced) sense/type to *the* (given) type/sense. The same distinction can be put in another way and in our old terms as resulting from a combination of the two distinctions of direction of fit and onus of match, as shown by the following table:

		Direction of Fit	Onus of Match
c-identifying	..	N to I	S to T
stating	..	N to I	T to S
instancing	..	I to N	S to T
b-identifying	..	I to N	T to S

In this table we may say that with both c- and b-identifying the direction of fit is *parallel* to the onus of match, whereas with both stating and instancing the direction and onus are *opposite*. In identifying we fit the name to the item because the sense of the former matches the type of the latter, or we fit the item to the name because the type of the former matches the sense of the latter: but in stating and instancing we fit the name/item to the item/name because the type/sense of the *latter* matches the sense/type of the *former*. In the verbalisations given in our original diagram, parallelism is shown by the subject of the sentence being in italics.

We cannot, in either sense of "identify", identify I as not a T: to identify as not is nonsense for not to identify. Whereas, therefore, the use of the affirmative sentence form S will not decide whether we are identifying or stating or instancing, the use of the negative sentence form SN makes it clear that we must be either stating or instancing. In similar ways other variations in the permitted forms of sentence will in general have effects on the varieties of speech-acts which, in uttering them, we may be performing. (Though in general of course also the use of any one sentence form does not tie us down to the performance of some *one* particular variety of speech-act.)